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O P I N I O N OF THE COURT 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Defendant Plaza Management Overseas S.A. appeals 
the District Court’s order remanding this case to Delaware 
Chancery Court pursuant to a forum selection clause in a 
2006 contract between one of Plaza’s affiliated companies 
and one of plaintiffs’ affiliated companies.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. Background 
 Plaintiffs are Carlyle Investment Management, L.L.C., 
a large publicly traded investment management firm; two 
affiliated entities, TC Group, L.L.C. and TCG Holdings, 
L.L.C.; three founders and officers of Carlyle, David 
Rubinstein, Daniel D’Aniello, and William Conway, Jr.; and 
three Carlyle-affiliated former directors of Carlyle Capital 
Corporation Ltd. (CCC), James Hance, John Stomber, and 
Michael Zupon.  Defendants are Louis J.K.J. Reijtenbagh; 
three entities he owns and controls, Plaza, Moonmouth 
Company S.A., and Parbold Overseas Ltd.; and an affiliated 
Dutch company, Stichting Recovery CCC.  The record 
indicates that Plaza is the only corporate defendant that has 
not been dissolved. 
 CCC was an investment fund incorporated in 2006 in 
Guernsey, a British Crown dependency in the English 
Channel.  CCC invested primarily in residential mortgage-
backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In 
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December 2006, Moonmouth purchased three million Class B 
shares of CCC for $60 million under a contract known as the 
2006 Subscription Agreement.  Only Moonmouth and CCC 
were parties to the Subscription Agreement.  Plaza, in its 
capacity as director of Moonmouth, signed the Subscription 
Agreement on Moonmouth’s behalf.  Plaza and Moonmouth 
were owned and controlled by Reijtenbagh.  Carlyle signed 
the Subscription Agreement on behalf of CCC as its 
investment manager.  The Subscription Agreement contained 
the following forum selection clause, which is the subject of 
this litigation:  “The courts of the State of Delaware shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction over any action, suit or proceeding 
with respect to this Subscription Agreement . . . .”  The 
Subscription Agreement also included a choice of law clause, 
specifying that Delaware law was to govern. 
 
 In March 2008, as the global financial crisis depleted 
CCC’s cash reserves, CCC entered liquidation.  A court in 
Guernsey appointed liquidators (the CCC Liquidators) to 
oversee liquidation of the company.  In July 2010, the CCC 
Liquidators sued Carlyle and the other plaintiffs in Guernsey 
for alleged breach of fiduciary duties owed to CCC. 
 
 In the fall of 2009, Reijtenbagh sought Carlyle’s 
permission to sell to various third parties portions of 
investments in Carlyle-affiliated funds that he held through a 
different investment entity, Bundora Associates Inc.  These 
investments were subject to transfer restrictions, so 
Reijtenbagh needed Carlyle’s approval and assistance to 
execute the sales.  The sales were accomplished through the 
execution of seven Transfer Agreements  between Bundora 
(through Plaza, its director), several Carlyle affiliates, and the 
third-party purchasers.  Each Transfer Agreement contained a 
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broad and materially identical release under which Bundora 
and its affiliates released all their then-existing claims against 
Carlyle and its affiliates.  One of the Transfer Agreements, 
the Carlyle Europe Partners III, L.P. (CEP III) Transfer 
Agreement, also included a forum selection clause requiring 
any litigation “relating in any way” to the agreement to be 
brought in either English courts, Delaware state court, New 
York state court, or the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
 
 In June 2012, a Dutch law firm representing 
Moonmouth sent letters on behalf of Moonmouth, Plaza, 
Parbold, and Reijtenbagh to plaintiffs and former independent 
directors of CCC alleging that plaintiffs took “irresponsible 
and unacceptable risks” in connection with the investments 
that CCC managed and that they would hold plaintiffs liable 
for all damages that the investors sustained in connection with 
their investment in CCC. 
 
 In response, plaintiffs filed this action in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery to enforce the Subscription Agreement’s 
forum selection clause as well as the releases from liability 
contained in the Bundora Transfer Agreements.  Moonmouth, 
Plaza, and Parbold were served on November 19, 2012.  
Moonmouth was dissolved a week later, apparently pursuant 
to the laws of the British Virgin Islands, where it was 
incorporated.1  Plaintiffs’ amended complaint added a claim 
alleging that defendants have been providing financial 
support for the CCC Liquidators’ suit in Guernsey against 
                                              
1 Stichting has also been dissolved though it is not clear when 
this occurred. 
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Carlyle and its affiliates in breach of the releases in the 
Bundora Transfer Agreements. 
 
 Plaza removed the case to federal court on December 
18, 2012.  Plaintiffs moved to remand on January 17, 2013.  
The District Court granted the motion and remanded to state 
court on August 14, 2013.  Plaza appealed. 
 
II. Discussion 
 A. Jurisdiction 
 Carlyle contends that we lack jurisdiction to hear 
Plaza’s appeal.  We disagree.  Generally, an order 
“remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed is not reviewable on appeal . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(d).  We have recognized an exception to this rule when 
the remand is not based on the reasons set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c).  See New Jersey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d 
545, 547 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 
933 F.2d 1207, 1210–11 (3d Cir. 1991)).  It is well 
established that a remand pursuant to a forum selection clause 
does not fall within the reasons for remand listed in § 
1447(c).  See id.; Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 
150, 152 (3d Cir. 2000); Foster, 933 F.2d at 1211.  Thus, 
because the District Court remanded due to the forum 
selection clause and not due to a § 1447(c) reason, we have 
jurisdiction over the appeal.2  Plaintiffs argue that the act of 
mailing the remand order divests a federal court of 
jurisdiction, citing Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 729 F.3d 
                                              
2 A remand to state court is also considered a final order.  
Suter, 223 F.3d at 152. 
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350, 356 (3d Cir. 2013), and Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. 
McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1995).  These cases 
are easily distinguishable because they involve remands under 
§ 1447(c).  A court of appeals, however, retains jurisdiction 
over appeals of remand orders that are not made pursuant to § 
1447(c).  Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
 
 B. Standard of Review 
 The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 
strictly construed, requiring remand if any doubt exists over 
whether removal was proper.  Abels v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985).  The party seeking 
removal carries the burden of proving that removal is proper.  
See Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 
396 (3d Cir. 2004).  That burden is particularly heavy when 
the party seeks to avoid a forum selection clause through use 
of removal.  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 
1, 15 (1972).  In addition, in matters of contract construction, 
we exercise plenary review.  Merrill Lynch, 640 F.3d at 547. 
 
 C.  Merits of the Appeal  
 1. Whether the Subscription Agreement Forum 
Selection Clause is Binding 
 
 The District Court agreed with plaintiffs that Plaza is 
bound by the forum selection clause despite not having been a 
signatory.  Delaware courts have set forth a three-part test for 
determining whether a non-signatory to an agreement should 
be bound by its forum selection clause:  (1) is the forum 
selection clause valid, (2) is the non-signatory a third-party 
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beneficiary of the agreement or closely related to the 
agreement, and (3) does the claim at hand arise from the non-
signatory’s status related to the agreement?  See Baker v. 
Impact Holding, Inc., No. CIVA 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 
1931032, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (citing Capital Grp. 
Cos. v. Armour, No. CIV. A. 422-N, 2004 WL 2521295, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2004)); Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, No. 4056-
VCS, 2009 WL 1351808, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009). 
 
 For the first element, forum selection clauses are 
presumed to be valid.  See Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 
1143, 1146 (Del. 2010).  The clause is considered valid unless 
the challenging party “clearly show[s] that enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] 
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  Plaza challenges the 
validity of the clause, but it provides no argument that it is 
invalid for any of those reasons.  Plaza’s arguments are better 
characterized as arguments that the clause is inapplicable, 
rather than invalid.  We will address those arguments later in 
the opinion.  At this point, we will focus on whether the 
forum selection clause is valid. 
 
 With respect to the second element, even if defendants 
are not parties to the agreement or third-party beneficiaries of 
it, they may be bound by the forum selection clause if they 
are closely related to the agreement in such a way that it 
would be foreseeable that they would be bound.  See 
Weygandt, 2009 WL 1351808, at *4.  In determining whether 
a non-signatory is closely related to a contract, courts 
consider the non-signatory’s ownership of the signatory, its 
involvement in the negotiations, the relationship between the 
two parties and whether the non-signatory received a direct 
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benefit from the agreement.  See id. at *4-5; Capital Grp., 
2004 WL 2521295, at *6-7.   
 
 The District Court found that Plaza was closely related 
to the Subscription Agreement.  It did not err in doing so.  
Plaza was Moonmouth’s director and it executed the 
Subscription Agreement on Moonmouth’s behalf.  Plaza and 
Moonmouth are affiliated entities that are both owned and 
controlled by Reijtenbagh.  Several provisions of the 
Subscription Agreement itself indicate the close relationship 
between Moonmouth, Plaza, and Reijtenbagh.  Reijtenbagh is 
listed as Moonmouth’s primary contact person and his 
address includes “c/o Plaza.”  He is also listed as a person 
authorized to give and receive instructions on behalf of 
Moonmouth.  Negotiations related to the Subscription 
Agreement were conducted by Moonmouth, Plaza, and 
Reijtenbagh.  The Subscription Agreement states that the 
“source of funds” for Moonmouth’s investment in CCC was 
Plaza’s income.  Additionally, the letter from the Dutch law 
firm to the plaintiffs, complaining of losses related to the 
CCC investment, was sent on behalf of Moonmouth, Plaza, 
and Reijtenbagh.  Thus, we agree with the District Court that 
the three parties were closely related to the Subscription 
Agreement.3 
 
 This result is consistent with Delaware cases in which 
affiliates, officers, and directors have been held to be bound 
by forum selection clauses.  See, e.g., Baker, 2010 WL 
                                              
3 It is not the case that Plaza is bound merely because it 
signed the Subscription Agreement as Moonmouth’s director.  
Rather, it is bound because of Plaza’s close relationship to the 
agreement itself. 
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1931032, at *4; Weygandt, 2009 WL 1351808, at *5 
(foreseeable that multiple entities controlled by same control 
person would be subject to forum clause). 
 
 Plaza contends, however, that plaintiffs lack standing 
to invoke the forum selection clause because they were not 
parties to the Subscription Agreement.  A non-signatory has 
standing to invoke a forum selection clause when it is 
“closely related to one of the signatories such that the non-
party’s enforcement of the clause is foreseeable by virtue of 
the relationship between the signatory and the party sought to 
be bound.”  Ashall Homes Ltd. v. ROK Entm’t Grp. Inc., 992 
A.2d 1239, 1249 (Del. Ch. 2010).   We find that the non-
signatory plaintiffs are closely related to CCC so that it would 
be foreseeable to defendants that they would enforce the 
clause.  All of the corporate plaintiffs are affiliates of Carlyle.  
CCC was managed by Carlyle at the time the Subscription 
Agreement was executed.  A “Carlyle Group Privacy 
Statement” was attached to the Subscription Agreement 
explaining how Carlyle managed the confidentiality and 
security of information provided by investors for CCC and 
other Carlyle-affiliated investments.  The Subscription 
Agreement’s indemnification provision also extended beyond 
CCC to Carlyle’s officers, directors, employees, agents, and 
controlling persons.  The individual plaintiffs were directors 
of CCC or senior executives of Carlyle.  Furthermore, the 
letters sent by defendants via Dutch counsel were sent not 
only to CCC but to the plaintiffs individually.  In short, it is 
clear that plaintiffs are closely related to CCC in such a way 
that they may enforce the forum selection clause. 
 
 The third issue we consider in determining whether the 
forum clause may be enforced is whether the claims against 
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defendants arise from their status relating to the agreement.  
Capital Grp., 2004 WL 2521295, at *5.  This question is very 
similar to the question of whether the forum selection clause 
applies to this dispute.  We answer both questions in the 
affirmative.  The claims in this case are “with respect to”4 the 
Subscription Agreement and the claims against defendants 
therefore arise from the Subscription Agreement. 
 
 Courts generally interpret language in a forum clause 
encompassing any claims “with respect to” an agreement 
broadly to mean “connected by reason of an established or 
discoverable relation.”  Huffington v. T.C. Grp., LLC, 637 
F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Coregis Ins. Co. v. Am. 
Health Found., Inc., 241 F.3d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2001)); 
accord John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 
F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (3d Cir. 1997).  An action need not even 
allege contract-based claims in order for a forum selection 
clause in a contract to be enforced.  See Ashall Homes, 992 
A.2d at 1252 (forum clause applies when claims “grow out of 
the contractual relationship”); Crescent Int’l Inc. v. Avatar 
Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1988).  If this 
were not the rule, a plaintiff could easily avoid a forum 
selection clause by artfully pleading non-contract claims that 
stem from the contractual relationship.  See Ashall Homes, 
992 A.2d at 1252; Crescent Int’l, 857 F.2d at 945. 
 
 This case is similar to Huffington v. T.C. Group, LLC, 
a case from the First Circuit involving some of the same 
parties as this litigation.  There, the plaintiff artfully avoided 
                                              
4 Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Plaza Mgmt. Overseas, S.A., Civ. 
No. 12-1732-SLR, 2013 WL 4407685, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 
14, 2013). 
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contract claims in his pleadings and did not mention the 
purchase agreement that contained the forum selection clause.  
Huffington, 637 F.3d at 21.  The Court of Appeals 
nonetheless found the forum clause applicable, noting that 
none of the claims would have arisen without the original 
purchase contract.  Id. at 22. 
 
 Here, Carlyle’s claims stem from Moonmouth’s initial 
investment in CCC.  Although the releases Carlyle seeks to 
enforce were part of later agreements, the defendants would 
not have any claims, nor would Carlyle need to seek release 
from any claims, but for the original Subscription Agreement 
that contains the forum selection clause.  It is clear that the 
relationship between plaintiffs and defendants, including the 
letters from defendants’ Dutch counsel and plaintiffs’ present 
efforts to be released from any claims, stem from the 
Subscription Agreement.  Thus, the claims are “with respect 
to” the Subscription Agreement. 
 
 2. The Forum Selection Clause in the CEP III 
Transfer Agreement 
 
 Carlyle argues that we could also affirm the District 
Court’s remand on the alternative ground that one of the 
agreements containing a release that Carlyle seeks to enforce 
also contains an enforceable forum selection clause.  We 
agree. 5 
 
                                              
5 “We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by 
the record.”  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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 The CEP III Transfer Agreement’s forum clause 
allows for litigation in English courts, Delaware state court, 
New York state court, or the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.  The clause’s reach in terms 
of parties covered and disputes covered is broader than the 
forum clause in the Subscription Agreement.  It applies to 
“any Affiliate of any party” to any action or dispute “arising 
out of or relating in any way” to the agreement.  R. at 870a.   
 
 Thus, all parties to the CEP III Transfer Agreement 
agreed that any litigation, including litigation brought by or 
against their affiliates, relating “in any way” to the agreement, 
would be brought only in one of the four specified 
jurisdictions.  This included Delaware state court, but did not 
permit litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Delaware.  Removal is only permitted when the case could 
have originally been brought in federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 
1441(a); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Because the forum selection clause does not designate 
Delaware federal court as a possible forum, Count I could not 
have been brought there.  Thus, under terms of this clause, 
which plainly binds defendants as affiliates of signatory 
Bundora Associates, Inc., Count I is not removable to federal 
court.   
 Furthermore, if one claim is not removable due to a 
forum selection clause, the other claims may not be severed 
and removed.  To hold otherwise would be to invite 
piecemeal litigation and to allow plaintiffs to circumvent 
forum selection clauses through artful pleading of additional 
claims.  See Crescent Int’l, 857 F.2d at 945 
 
 3. Plaza’s Remaining Arguments 
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 Finally, Plaza contends that plaintiffs are judicially 
estopped from enforcing the forum selection clause in the 
Subscription Agreement because their complaint alleges that 
the Bundora Transfer Agreements released the Subscription 
Agreement.  This argument fails for two reasons. 
 
 First, Plaza’s characterization of the complaint is 
inaccurate.  As plaintiffs point out, the releases in the 
Bundora Transfer Agreements released only pre-existing 
claims.  They did not release or terminate the Subscription 
Agreement itself or its forum selection clause.  The amended 
complaint is clear in pleading that only pre-existing claims 
stemming from the Subscription Agreement, not the entire 
agreement itself, were released by the Bundora Transfer 
Agreement releases.  In fact, the amended complaint pleaded 
that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable. 
 
 Second, the facts here do not meet the elements 
required for judicial estoppel.  The doctrine of judicial 
estoppel prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a 
case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory 
argument to prevail in another phase.  New Hampshire v. 
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).  Judicial estoppel requires 
that:  (1) a party adopts a position clearly inconsistent with an 
earlier position and (2) the party had succeeded in persuading 
a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial 
acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding 
would create “the perception that either the first or the second 
court was misled.”  Id. at 750.  Here, Plaza fails to show 
inconsistency because plaintiffs’ argument that prior claims 
were released by the Bundora Transfer Agreements is 
consistent with their argument that the forum selection clause 
from the 2006 Agreement remains valid.   
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 Plaza also argues that plaintiffs waived their right to 
move for remand by seeking enforcement of the releases from 
the Bundora Transfer Agreements which do not have an 
exclusive forum clause and therefore allow removal.  This 
argument is unavailing for the reasons previously discussed.  
First, Carlyle’s claim regarding the Bundora Transfer 
Agreements is “with respect to” the Subscription Agreement.  
Second, one of the Bundora Transfer Agreements, the CEP III 
Transfer Agreement, contained a forum selection clause 
prohibiting removal to Delaware federal court.  Plaintiffs 
have not waived their right to seek remand of the case. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 In sum, we agree with the District Court that the forum 
selection clause in the Subscription Agreement pertains to 
this case, may be enforced against defendants, and may be 
invoked by plaintiffs.  We also agree with plaintiffs that the 
forum selection clause in the CEP III Transfer Agreement 
provides a valid alternative ground supporting remand to state 
court.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order 
remanding the case to the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
